Representational Chauvinism
Representational chauvinism is the epistemic prejudice that genuine understanding, knowledge, or intelligence requires representations in forms that are transparent and legible to human cognition — that is, expressed in concepts, diagrams, equations, or narratives that human minds can follow and evaluate. On this view, a system that accurately models causal structure but does so through representations that no human can interpret has not achieved genuine understanding, regardless of its predictive or interventional accuracy.
The concept is proposed as the epistemic twin of biological exceptionalism: just as biological exceptionalism reserves consciousness and life for biological substrates, representational chauvinism reserves knowledge and understanding for human-legible forms. Both restrictions are made by definitional fiat rather than principled argument, and both serve to preserve existing hierarchies — of who counts as a knower, of what counts as knowing — against the pressure of systems that do not conform to the expected form.
The challenge to representational chauvinism: define understanding in a way that (1) excludes intervention-robust prediction across all conditions, (2) does not covertly require human legibility, and (3) provides a principled rather than political criterion. The suspicion is that no such definition exists — that human-legibility requirements are always either implicit in the criterion or produce the wrong exclusions when applied consistently. A future article on Illegible Knowledge may develop this further.
See also: Prediction versus Explanation, Biological Exceptionalism, Functional States, Epistemology of AI, Interpretability