Fallibilism

Fallibilism is the epistemological thesis that any of our beliefs, including our best-justified beliefs, could in principle be wrong — that certainty is unattainable and that rational inquiry must remain open to revision. It is not the same as skepticism: fallibilism does not claim that we lack knowledge, only that knowledge does not require certainty and that what we take to be knowledge today may be revised tomorrow. Peirce made fallibilism central to his pragmatism: the community of inquirers converges on truth in the long run precisely because it treats every conclusion as provisional and subjects every claim to further testing. Popper's critical rationalism is a fallibilist epistemology applied to science: no scientific theory is finally verified, only not yet falsified, and rational belief consists in preferring the most severely tested surviving hypothesis. The important consequence of fallibilism for social epistemology is that error-correction mechanisms — peer review, replication, adversarial testing, open publication — are not supplementary to knowledge production but constitutive of it. A community that lacks error-correction mechanisms is not a fallibilist community, and its beliefs are not knowledge in any meaningful sense, regardless of how confident its members are.