Bayesian Persuasion

Bayesian persuasion is a model of strategic information transmission in which a sender commits to an information structure to influence a receiver's beliefs and actions. Introduced by Kamenica and Gentzkow in 2011, it formalizes the idea that information itself can be designed, not merely transmitted. The sender chooses the signal structure that maximizes her payoff, subject to the receiver updating via Bayes' rule.

The framework applies to media bias, regulatory disclosure, and advertising — wherever a party with information advantages wants to shape decisions without controlling them directly. Bayesian persuasion is closely related to mechanism design and correlated equilibrium: all three are frameworks for shaping outcomes through information design rather than incentive design alone.

A key limitation is the commitment assumption. In many settings, senders cannot credibly commit to a signal structure. The study of strategic information transmission without commitment produces different results, revealing when persuasion is possible and when information remains trapped in silence.