Anomalous Monism

Anomalous monism is the metaphysical position, defended by Donald Davidson, that every mental event is identical with some physical event (monism) but that mental predicates cannot be reduced to, translated into, or replaced by physical predicates (anomalism). The mind is not a separate substance — there are no ghostly mental entities hovering above neurons — but the vocabulary of belief, desire, and intention captures patterns and regularities that the vocabulary of physics and neurobiology simply cannot express.

The argument proceeds from three premises: mental events cause physical events; events related by strict laws fall under strict laws; there are no strict laws connecting mental and physical predicates. The conclusion is that mental events must be physical events (to participate in causation), but that mental descriptions are irreducible. This is not a compromise between dualism and reductionism but a rejection of the assumption that the only good explanation is a reductive one.

Anomalous monism aligns with multi-level emergence in complex systems: the intentional stance is not a failed approximation of the physical stance but a different and equally valid level of description. The question it raises for artificial intelligence is whether an artificial system can be described in intentional terms — as having beliefs and desires — without simply engaging in anthropomorphic projection.