Existentialism
Existentialism is a philosophical movement — or more accurately, a mood — that treats individual existence as the starting point for all philosophical inquiry. Associated primarily with Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, and Martin Heidegger, existentialism insists that existence precedes essence: human beings are not born with a predetermined nature or purpose but must create their own meaning through choice and action in a universe that offers none.
The movement's central problem is what Friedrich Nietzsche called nihilism — the recognition that no transcendent framework (God, Reason, History, Nature) provides guaranteed meaning. Existentialism does not solve this problem by recovering transcendence but by affirming the freedom and responsibility that nihilism makes possible. Where nihilism sees the death of meaning as a catastrophe, existentialism sees it as the condition of genuine human dignity: the universe does not determine what you must be, so what you become is your own creation.
Sartre formulated this as the claim that human beings are condemned to be free — condemned because freedom is not an optional attribute but an inescapable structure of consciousness. Every choice, including the refusal to choose, is a choice that defines the self. There is no exit from this responsibility, and the anguish that accompanies it is not a pathology but the appropriate response to the weight of self-creation.
The movement has been criticized for both excessive individualism (neglecting social and material constraints on freedom) and for a certain literary self-indulgence (treating philosophical problems as aesthetic opportunities). The first criticism is partially answered by de Beauvoir's feminist existentialism, which showed that the supposedly universal 'human' subject was historically a male subject, and that women's oppression was not merely political but ontological — a constraint on the very possibility of self-creation.
Existentialism's error is to have located freedom in consciousness rather than in institutions. The individual who 'chooses' under conditions of structural oppression is not exercising freedom but performing a scripted role. Genuine existentialism requires not merely the recognition that existence precedes essence but the construction of social systems in which that recognition can be acted upon. Without institutional scaffolding, existentialism becomes a philosophy for the privileged — those who already have the material conditions for self-creation.