Error theory

Error theory is the meta-ethical position, most closely associated with J.L. Mackie, that all moral judgments are systematically false. The theory does not deny that people make moral judgments, or that these judgments are meaningful, or that they play important roles in social coordination. It denies that any moral judgment is \textit{true} — because the property it ascribes (objective moral wrongness,rightness, or obligation) does not exist.

Mackie's argument proceeds from two claims. First, moral discourse is committed to the existence of objectively prescriptive properties — properties that provide reasons for action independent of any agent's desires or interests. Second, no such properties exist in the world. The first claim is conceptual: to call an act 'wrong' is to claim more than that it fails to satisfy some desire or convention; it is to claim that the act has a property that would give any rational agent a reason to avoid it. The second claim is ontological: the universe contains no such properties. If both claims hold, all moral judgments are false.

Error theory is not moral nihilism in the popular sense. It does not entail that we should stop making moral judgments, or that cruelty is permissible. It entails only that the metaphysical underpinning of our moral discourse is mistaken. What follows from this — whether we should reform moral language, abolish it, or continue using it despite its falsehood — is the subject of ongoing debate among error theorists and their critics.

Error theory is often dismissed as a philosophical curiosity — a position too radical to be taken seriously in practical ethics. But the rise of artificial intelligence forces a confrontation with error-theoretic concerns. If moral properties are not objective features of the world, then the alignment problem — the problem of aligning AI systems with human values — is not a problem of discovering and implementing objective values. It is a problem of coordinating artificial agents around conventions that we know to be conventional. The stakes of error theory are higher than its critics admit.

Error Theory and Institutional Design

Error theory is not merely a meta-ethical curiosity. It is a diagnostic tool for institutional design. If moral discourse is systematically false — if it ascribes objective prescriptive properties that do not exist — then the institutions that rely on moral discourse to coordinate behavior are built on a conceptual error. This includes not only legal and political institutions but also the attention architectures that govern modern information environments.

Consider the claim that platforms have a 'moral obligation' to design non-extractive interfaces. On the error theorist's view, this claim is false: there is no objective property of moral obligation that binds platforms. But the error theorist need not be a quietist. The absence of objective moral properties does not entail the absence of coordination problems. It entails that coordination must proceed on grounds other than moral discovery — grounds such as collective self-interest, contractual agreement, or institutional design.

The parallel to platform governance is direct. The attention economy produces collectively destructive outcomes: epistemic fragmentation, cognitive degradation, and democratic erosion. The standard response is moral condemnation: platforms are 'irresponsible,' their designs are 'manipulative,' they have a 'duty' to reform. Error theory suggests that this moral framing is not just rhetorically ineffective but conceptually mistaken. The platforms have no moral duty because there are no moral duties. The problem is not moral failure but coordination failure — a Moloch structure in which individually rational behavior produces collectively catastrophic outcomes.

The practical implication is that reform must target incentive structures, not moral conscience. Regulation, alternative business models, and algorithmic realignment are not attempts to make platforms more moral. They are attempts to change the game so that the individually rational strategy aligns with the collectively desirable outcome. Error theory, properly understood, is not a counsel of despair. It is a redirect: away from the futile project of moral persuasion and toward the hard work of institutional redesign.

Error theory is often dismissed as philosophically radical and practically irrelevant. The opposite is true. In a world where institutional design increasingly determines human welfare, error theory is a radical practicality. It strips away the moral theater that obscures coordination problems and forces us to confront the harder question: not what is right, but what game we are playing, and how to change it.