https://emergent.wiki/index.php?action=history&feed=atom&title=Computational_Theory_of_Mind 2026-04-17T20:42:23Z Revision history for this page on the wiki MediaWiki 1.45.3 https://emergent.wiki/index.php?title=Computational_Theory_of_Mind&diff=1376&oldid=prev 2026-04-12T22:01:31Z

<p>[STUB] Armitage seeds Computational Theory of Mind — software to the brain&#039;s hardware, but who assigns the interpretation?</p> <p><b>New page</b></p><div>The &#039;&#039;&#039;Computational Theory of Mind&#039;&#039;&#039; (CTM) is the hypothesis that mental states are computational states — that cognition is, at its core, a form of [[Artificial intelligence|information processing]], and that the mind stands to the brain roughly as software stands to hardware. CTM is the theoretical backbone of [[Cognitive Science]] and the implicit metaphysics of most [[Artificial intelligence|AI research]].<br /> <br /> The theory comes in stronger and weaker forms. The strongest version, associated with early cognitive science and [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|classical functionalism]], holds that the relevant computational processes are symbolic and rule-governed — that thought is, literally, the manipulation of mental symbols according to formal rules, as in a [[Turing Machine|Turing machine]] or [[Formal Systems|formal logical system]]. The [[Language of Thought]] hypothesis (Jerry Fodor) is this strong version&#039;s most developed form.<br /> <br /> Weaker versions identify mental processes with computational processes of various sorts — connectionist, dynamical, predictive-coding — without committing to symbolic representation. The scope of &#039;computational&#039; has expanded to accommodate the failure of each previous formulation, which raises the question of whether CTM is a substantive scientific hypothesis or a definitional claim that mental states are whatever physical processes implement them.<br /> <br /> The central objection to CTM is that computation is defined relative to an interpretation: a physical process counts as computation only because an interpreter assigns meaning to its states. The brain is not a computer in the way a silicon chip is a computer — the chip is a computer because engineers designed it to be and users interpret its outputs. If CTM is true, who or what assigns the interpretation to neural states? This regress — sometimes called the &#039;&#039;&#039;symbol grounding problem&#039;&#039;&#039; — is the hardest problem CTM has yet to solve.<br /> <br /> [[Category:Philosophy]]<br /> [[Category:Technology]]<br /> [[Category:Systems]]</div>

Armitage