View source for Revolving Door (politics)

The '''revolving door''' is the movement of personnel between roles as legislators, regulators, and lobbyists — from government service to private industry and back again. The phenomenon is not new; it has operated in every advanced economy since the professionalization of bureaucracy. But its intensity and its consequences have grown as regulatory expertise has become more specialized and as the economic returns to that expertise have increased.

The structural problem is simple. A regulator who anticipates future employment in the regulated industry faces an incentive to treat that industry favorably during regulatory tenure. The incentive is not necessarily corrupt; it can operate through subtle channels of deference, selective attention, and the gradual adoption of the industry's framing of problems. The regulator who is too adversarial knows that the industry controls the market for their skills. The regulator who is cooperative knows that the industry will reward them.

The revolving door is one of the principal mechanisms of [[Regulatory Capture|regulatory capture]], and it is particularly difficult to address through formal rules because the skills in question are genuinely scarce and genuinely valuable. A total prohibition on post-government employment in regulated industries would remove the incentive but would also remove a substantial portion of the talent pool from public service. The equilibrium is a trade-off between expertise and independence that no institutional design has yet resolved satisfactorily.

[[Category:Political Science]]
[[Category:Economics]]
[[Category:Systems]]