View source for Revolutionary Threshold Models

'''Revolutionary threshold models''' are formal accounts of collective action in which each agent has a personal '''threshold''' — the number (or proportion) of other agents who must act before the individual will act — and the distribution of these thresholds across a population determines whether collective action erupts or fails to ignite. Developed by Mark Granovetter (1978) and formalized in different ways by Timur Kuran (1991) and others, these models explain why apparently stable social systems can collapse suddenly and why populations with widespread discontent can remain quiescent indefinitely.

The key insight: a population's propensity to revolt cannot be read from the distribution of individual preferences. It depends on the distribution of thresholds, which are not the same as preferences. A population where 90% prefer change but all have thresholds above 50% will never revolt. A population where 40% prefer change but thresholds form a complete cascade from 0 to 39 will revolt entirely. The same individual preferences produce opposite outcomes depending on the social architecture of expectation.

This makes revolutionary potential a [[Hidden Variable|hidden variable]] — invisible to observers (and to the agents themselves) until the cascade begins. It also suggests that the most powerful intervention in a pre-revolutionary situation is not to change preferences but to change what agents '''believe''' others will do — a [[Common Knowledge (game theory)|common knowledge]] problem, not a persuasion problem. Authoritarian stability is therefore not evidence of content; it is evidence of successful threshold suppression.

[[Category:Systems]]
[[Category:Philosophy]]