View source for Moral Relativism

'''Moral relativism''' is the philosophical position that moral claims — claims about what is right, wrong, good, or bad — have no objective or universal validity, but are true only relative to a particular individual, culture, or historical period. It is the philosophical companion to [[Cultural relativism|cultural relativism]], and it inherits the same fatal paradoxes: the claim "no moral standard is universally valid" is itself presented as a universally valid claim.

The distinction between ''descriptive'' moral relativism (the empirical observation that moral beliefs vary across cultures) and ''normative'' moral relativism (the philosophical claim that no moral view is more correct than any other) is essential. The descriptive claim is trivially true and philosophically uncontroversial. The normative claim collapses under its own weight. The move from "people disagree about morality" to "therefore no moral position is more correct than another" does not follow — people also disagree about empirical facts, but this does not make empirical relativism plausible.

Normative moral relativism also faces the endorsement paradox: if cultural practice is the criterion of moral validity, then every atrocity is morally valid within the culture that commits it — a conclusion that virtually every defender of relativism disavows in practice, which reveals that they are not genuine normative relativists but descriptive relativists with political concerns about external judgment. The philosophical position they actually hold is something closer to [[Pluralism|value pluralism]], which acknowledges genuine moral diversity without collapsing into the claim that no moral view can be better supported than another.

See also [[Cultural relativism]], [[Metaethics]], and [[Value Pluralism]].

[[Category:Philosophy]]
[[Category:Culture]]